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Supply Chain Contract Evolution
Abstract
This paper draws together theories from organisational and neo-institutional literatures to
address the evolution of supply chain contracts. Using a longitudinal case study of the
Norwegian State Railways, we examine how firms move through the stages in an interorganisational process of supply chain contract evolution and how they can cooperate to
ensure efficiency and equity in their contractual relationship. The findings suggest that
inefficient and inequitable initial contracts can occur in part, because of the cognitive
shortcomings in human decision-making processes that reveal themselves early in the
arrangement before learning and trust building can accumulate. We then reveal how parties
can renegotiate towards a more equitable and efficient supply chain contract.

Keywords: contract design, business process modelling, supply chain management

Introduction
As the phenomenon of outsourcing matures firms are increasingly choosing to outsource key
components of their value chain. However, deeper and more core outsourcing increases
dependence on independent producers in a supply network and opens the firm to a variety of
operational and strategic risks (e.g., Barthelemy, 2003; Earl, 1996; Knight and Harland, 2005;
Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Verwaal and Hesselmans, 2004). Mitigating these risks impose
governance costs on companies to ensure the strategic and operational alignment of their
outsourced activities. Supply chain contracts provide protection by ensuring that promises or
obligations to perform particular actions are met (Macneil, 1978).
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An extensive literature shows how firms can write an efficient contract to protect
themselves from potential risks in outsourcing engagements (Barthelemy and Quelin, 2006;
Domberger, 1998; Hart and Moore, 1988; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). However, external and
internal circumstances frequently change, relationships evolve and contracts can become
outdated as the benefits and cost sharing between parties move out of balance. Studies of how
firms proceed from stage-to-stage as contractual relationships evolve dynamically are scarce
and represent a gap in the literature. This is true particularly in the case of supply chain
contracting, where most studies fail to acknowledge the dynamic nature of supply chain
operations and the subsequent need for contracts to evolve over time and as circumstance
change. What is needed is additional process-based research that shows how firms can adjust
contracts on an ongoing basis; in particular, how firms evolve from less complete to more
complete forms of contractual arrangement and from more formal to more informal forms of
effective governance.
This study aims to contribute to these issues by examining how firms progress in
their contractual relationship towards a more equitable and efficient contract. More
specifically, we focus on the supply chain contract as a dynamic process of cooperative interorganisation relationships. The key questions underlying this study are: (1) How do firms
cooperate to ensure that contracts are efficient and equitable? (2) When is cooperation feasible
in the contract design process? (3) How do firms renegotiate contracts to mitigate the risks in
contract design? We will answer these questions by drawing together theories from
evolutionary and neo-institutional economics to describe the evolution of inter-organisational
relationships in a case study of the Norwegian State Railway. The focus of the analysis is on
how firms can learn to cooperate and ensure that they move to a more efficient and equitable
contract. We believe that a rich longitudinal case study can provide insight into the evolution
of cooperation in supply chain outsourcing arrangements.
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The first section of the paper reviews the literature on supply chain contracts and the
potential risks associated with such relationships. From this literature we develop a
provisional model based on a sequence of four stages in inter-organisational governance
arrangements. The second section discusses our methodology and research design, as well as
the specifics of the research setting. The section on findings describes the events that took
place over the six-year study, divided into seven discrete events. In the final section, we
incorporate the evidence, discuss our interpretation of the events, and offer a more complete
model based on business process modelling (BPM) as a technique to drive cooperative
behaviour.

Theoretical Background
Supply chain contracts represent the “rules of engagement” for how partners will share the
benefits and the risks from uncertain supply or demand. These rules are imperfect and
research has shown that there are many agency problems inhibiting the effectiveness of
contract design (Jensen and Meckling, 2001). Such problems arise both because of the nature
of contracting and the nature of human behaviour.

From a contract perspective these

problems surface because of a natural misalignment of interests between the principal (the
contracting firm) and agent (the supplier) (Jensen and Meckling, 2001; Ross, 1973), the
failure of the contract to incentivise the parties correctly and monitor the relationship
effectively, thereby mitigating moral hazard concerns (Holmstrom, 1979) and natural
opportunities for opportunism created by bilateral dependent relations (Williamson, 1996).
From a human decision making perspective, problems occur because managers are boundedly
rational (Simon, 1976) when accounting for the vast array of contingencies that need to be
addressed in a contract, and inherently overoptimistic when faced with limited information,
leading firms to underestimate risks and overestimate benefits (Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003)
in the early stages of contracting.
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Scholars recognise that real contracts will be vague, or incomplete, on a number of
significant dimensions (Grossman and Hart, 1986). In the case of complex systems such as a
supply chain, it is impossible to provide an exhaustive description of the rights and
obligations of all contracting parties for every possible contingency. Governing complex
transactions requires that the contracting parties use a combination of instruments based on
intermediate degrees of contractual completeness to ensure that the parties can adapt to the
contingencies that arise in modern business (Williamson, 1985). Research suggests that
stochastic demand implies that organisations cannot attain efficient outcomes through formal
contracts alone (e.g., Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Woolthuis et al., 2005), making less structured
governance instruments necessary if a better level of co-production is to be achieved from the
relationship. These less formal instruments include trust (Clark, 1993; Gulati, 1995;
Nooteboom et al., 1997), reputation, hostages (Klein, 2000), and the ‘shadow of the future’
(Heide and Miner, 1992). According to this thinking, the business world comprises a network
of relationships developed and fostered through strategic collaboration (Bidault and Salgado,
2001; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Hakansson and Snehota, 1997; Holweg et al., 2005).
However, trust and cooperation does not arise easily and requires an unusual mix of
propensity, power and persistence among the partners in a relationship (Carson et al., 2003;
Johnsen et al., 2008).
Contractual arrangements based on intermediate degrees of completeness reflect, at
least in part, the push by scholars towards cooperation, trust and routine as substitutes for
detailed forms of contractual governance in the supply chain (Johnston et al., 2004). Trust can
be an efficient complement and substitute for formal contracts because once firms have
invested in a relationship (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Woolthuis et al., 2005) mutual
cooperation becomes a means of reducing costly contract negotiations (Zaheer et al., 1998).
Routine can also be used to foster a climate of positive reinforcement, independent of trust,
4

that can allow firms to avoid detailed monitoring and coordination costs (Zollo et al., 2002).
Although cooperation, trust and routine in the supply chain are widely acknowledged as
important to governance success, it is not clear how this should occur, particularly when what
is “best” for an exchange partner is usually judged according to its own profit expectations.
In summary, the sourcing of supply chain functions remains ideally described as an
arrangement of cooperative inter-firm relationships based on mutual commitment and trust
between buyers and suppliers (Johnston et al., 2004). In the next section we draw upon the
inter-organisational alliance and neo-institutional economics literatures to develop a dynamic,
process-based model of contractual change (see Figure 1). The provisional model describes
the sequence of stages that captures initial negotiation, ongoing learning processes that inform
the need for change and an assessment of when contract redesign is feasible.
<Insert Figure 1 here>

A Provisional Model
Contracts as a sequence of commitment, learning and renegotiation
Ring and Van de Ven (1994) propose a cooperative inter-organisational process framework
that consists of a sequence of negotiation, commitment and execution stages. Each of these
stages comprises a number of repeated interactions where the outcome is assessed by
management in terms of efficiency and equity. Both efficiency and equity are required
conditions for all organisational arrangements (Ouchi, 1980). Efficiency is central to most
standard models of economic exchange and is used by transaction cost researchers to define
the most, and least, costly governance structure for undertaking a transaction. Equity is
defined as “fair dealing” and is considered to be an equally important criterion for assessing
initial conditions in organisational arrangements (Arino and de la Torre 1998; Ouchi, 1980).
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The particular contractual provisions that are created and put into play hinge upon the
efficiency and equity of inter-firm governance (Reuer and Ariño, 2007). However, a reliance
on decision makers’ expectations in this process can be problematic. In behavioural decision
theory, studies have shown that people are over-optimistic about their own relative abilities
and futures (Weinstein, 1980). Lovallo and Sibony (2006) argue that managers tend to
exaggerate the degree of control they have over events and such over-optimism or overconfidence distorts the environment in which the managers believe they are operating. In the
making of strategic contract decisions, over-optimism not only generates unrealistic forecasts
of the outcomes but also leads managers to underestimate future risks. When decisions
represent unfamiliar territory, such as is frequently the case for supply chain contracts, the
risks from over-optimism are even more acute (Powell et al., 2006).
During the execution of a contractual arrangement the parties engage in a dynamic
learning process. This stage offers the opportunity for firms in a relationship to learn from
each other as well as to influence each other’s perceptions about their desirability as a partner.
The operational learning that takes place during this period is designed to ensure that all
parties become aware of their need to fulfil efficiency and equity conditions (Arino and de la
Torre, 1998). This is critical because as Lyles (1988) and Hamel (1991) argue, the initial
contracts can focus on the wrong set of issues and learning is required to add skills and
knowledge about firms to manage cooperative relationships (Westney, 1988).
The contractual relationship between AT&T and Yahoo serves as an example of
learning over the contract period. During the five-year long contract arrangement both parties
developed considerable knowledge about their own respective strengths and weaknesses.
They also engaged in mutual learning and sharing of information, both in operations and
relationship management. This new learning provided the catalyst for a renegotiated
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contractual relationship where AT&T sells its broadband DSL service under the joint AT&T
Yahoo brand name to maximise joint profit.
As prior contractual commitments are translated into concrete reality, parties may
experience inordinate degrees of relational risk and performance risk (Das and Bing-Sheng,
1996), inefficiency and inequity (Ring and Van De Ven, 1994), as well as inter-partner
conflicts and incongruence. A primary concern extensively discussed in the contract design
literature has been the threat of opportunism, adverse selection and moral hazard (Akerlof,
1970; Crocker and Reynolds, 1993; Holmstrom, 1979); where the divergence of goals among
the parties causes a partner firm to attempt to generate high profits at the expense of the other
party. To avoid these problems, scholars have suggested that procedures should be developed
(Arino and de la Torre, 1998) to monitor the exchange relationship against equity and
efficiency criteria (Johnsen et al., 2008; Ouchi and Maguire, 1975; Ring and Van De Ven,
1994). In the next section we describe a suitable criterion for the assessment of equity and
efficiency.
An assessment of equity and efficiency criteria
As a relationship evolves, firms may discover that the initial contract terms do not serve their
needs as expected. Unfortunately, parties do not always try to adjust the contract in a mutually
agreeable manner. Carson, et al. (1999) develop a criterion based on neo-institutional
economics that is used to show how inter-organisational cooperation can be achieved between
self-interested parties. This school of thought recognises that hypothetically ideal contract
types are often fundamentally flawed because incumbent organisations – with existing
operations and arrangements – are unable to see a remedially efficient alternative that can be
described and implemented with positive net gain (Williamson, 1999). Hence, existing
arrangements matter and at each point in a contract negotiation each of the actual and
potential contracting parties must be willing to move to the next stage in this process. As an
7

operational matter pertaining to the discussion here, this amounts to asking the following three
questions about a supply chain contract:
1. Joint profit requirement: Do existing contractual arrangements allow for joint profits
(with reallocation if needed)?
2. Reallocation feasibility requirement: If contract renegotiation is required, is it feasible
given the characteristics of the exchange arrangement? Is there support among the
contracting parties to move to a new arrangement?
3. Switchover feasibility requirement: Is it possible to generate new levels of cooperation
and trust between exchange partners and create greater cooperation to mitigate
contract opportunism? (Including set-up and take down costs).
Such requirements enable firms to evaluate whether changes or transitions to new contractual
arrangements are possible to restore efficiency and equity in an exchange relationship.
Re-evaluation and recommitment under revised conditions
The performance of a contractual relationship is determined at the outcome stage, where it can
either be stabilised, reformed, enter a state of progressive decline, or eventually be terminated
(Das and Teng, 2002). The outcome is likely to be influenced by the mode of interactions that
transpired during the execution stage (Das and Kumar, 2007). If parties in the relationship
attempt to reform their contractual arrangement to a closer-to-optimal one that yields
maximum efficiency and equity to all parties, the relationship progresses to the re-evaluation
and recommitment stage where firms take onboard the extent to which it is feasible to change
to a new contractual arrangement.
During these stages (i.e., execution and re-evaluation), trust plays a critical role in
supporting dynamic learning processes and the remediable efficiency criterion (Carson et al.,
2003; Holm et al., 1999; Ring and Van De Ven, 1994; Zaheer and Bell, 2005). Work by social
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scientists indicates that trust is an important condition to create an open and constructive
atmosphere that enables parties to share more accurate information in a more timely manner
and to jointly solve problems as they arise (e.g., Larson, 1992; Ring and Van De Ven, 1994).
Mayer and Argyre’s (2004) study of learning to contract in the personal computer industry
identified a positive relationship between increased trust and joint learning based on the
length of the relationship. Woolthuis et al. (2005) found that trust can be both a complement
and a substitute for contracting.
In a repetitive sequence of commitment, execution, dynamic learning and routine the
importance of renegotiation should not be underestimated. Contract renegotiation represents
considerably more than a simple repetition of the original contract and industry surveys have
consistently recognised the importance of contract renegotiations. For example, in the case of
supply chain contracts, the 2004 Supplier Selection and Management Report (SSMR, 2004)
reveals that over 55% of firms surveyed indicated that they are presently engaged in
renegotiating existing contracts with their suppliers. Effective execution of a new contract
requires that sufficient equity and efficiency be in play to ensure that all parties to the new
arrangement benefit.
In summary, the provisional model discussed in this section offers a comprehensive
framework for understanding the dynamic evolution of contractual and quasi-contractual
relationships and how parties in a relationship evolve together from one stage to the next in
order to meet their goals. The framework captures the initial expectations that parties have
about the gains that influence contracting arrangements. Yet, it is important to note that these
initial expectations should be carefully defined as they are likely to be influenced by errors of
judgment (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993). Based on initial expectations, the parties in a
contractual arrangement execute their contractual commitments. As commitments are
executed, learning takes place to monitor the extent to which value has been created and
9

distributed among parties. The feasibility of change is then assessed according to remediable
efficiency criteria. When change is possible, a new sequence of negotiation and commitment
then occurs that leads to revised contracts. This dynamic process brings in a new equilibrium,
which in turn, is followed by execution of the new contract.

Method and Research Design
Scholars have argued the need for qualitative research that allows us to understand the core
issues underlying the theory of collaboration. In particular, Smith et al., (1995 p.19) call for
“more longitudinal case studies that are capable of capturing the complexities and dynamics
of cooperation.” The analysis in this paper attempts to fill this void based on two theoretical
considerations: (1) it provides a striking example for illuminating the risk in contract design,
and (2) the companies had been in operation for a sufficient period of time, enabling us to
track change over time. The theoretical sampling based on this single case is therefore quite
straight forward (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007a). The case was chosen because it provides
an extreme example of a problem in supply chain procurement and provides unusual access to
rich longitudinal data.
Research site: Norwegian State Railways
The Norwegian State Railways (NSB) is one of Norway’s most important transport
companies, with traditions going back to the opening of the first railway in Norway in 1854.
NSB is fully owned by the Norwegian state. The main activities of NSB comprise passenger
traffic on trains and buses, and rail freight traffic.
Rail Gourmet Togservice Norge AS (RGT) is a joint venture between Rail Gourmet
and Umoe catering. The company delivers catering services to NSB’s trains in addition to
several bus companies. Their main service offerings comprise logistics and distribution,
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product development and marketing. Table 1 illustrates the main activities performed by NSB
and RGT.
<Insert Table 1 here>
Research setting: Catering service relationship
NSB has had a catering service onboard their long and medium distance passenger trains since
1918. RGT has provided the onboard catering service for NSB since 1918, forging a lasting
relationship between the two companies. In fact, NSB owned RGT for many years, but in
1995 decided to outsource catering services in order to save money and focus on the operation
of train traffic.
The logistics of catering onboard long distance trains are complex, largely because the
supplier must be at the railway station platform at the exact time the train arrives in order to
deliver supplies otherwise, the “customer” – in this case the train – is gone. Another challenge
is that trains can be rescheduled to take an alternative route, resulting in variations in
passenger numbers and subsequent last minute changes to onboard supplies. Whenever a train
is scheduled for a route where it is not back at the base station for several days it will require
large stocks of food and beverage.
For medium distance travel, NSB installed vending machines in the trains in the late
1990s to save on labour costs and improve product availability. The vending machines
replaced the shopping trolleys that had been used previously. For long distance trains, NSB
has always used a café wagon where the customers can buy both hot and cold meals.

Data Collection and Analysis
The primary source of data collected was based on a co-author’s 2001 – 2007 employment
experience. During this time she was exposed to a wide variety of positions within the
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company that ensured sufficient knowledge of the main issues described in this paper. The
positions within NSB include, but are not limited to work as: a logistics controller and
member of the contract process redesign team; procurement advisor and assistant contract
manager. During this six year period the co-author participated in all the business process
meetings and held discussions with members from both contracting teams. This level of
participatory observation ensures that a multidimensional perspective on the contractual
design process is described and enhances the validity of the case study (Gibbert et al., 2008).
Table 2 lists the 10 managers who were involved in this process indicating their company
affiliation and prior years of service.
<Insert Table 2 here>
To provide different angles on the same phenomenon and to triangulate the validity of our
findings we obtained various archival data (Yin, 2003). The archival data collected covered
the entire life of the catering contract from initial development in 1999 to renegotiation in
2004.

The

main

sources

were

the

interim

financial

reports

(http://www.nsb.no/internet/en/About_NSB/index.jhtml?language=en), documents from the
meetings held during contract negotiations, and the business process mapping exercise that
the two companies carried out cooperatively. Together, these sources constituted about 350
pages of detailed summaries and reports that described the challenges, objectives and
outcomes of the contract process. Additional archival data included a large volume of
organisational charts, market reports, and internal newsletters etc. Finally, we collected
relevant press clippings and releases dealing with the contract and firm operations.
Findings: Events and issues in contract development
The narrative below describes seven major events that transpired over the six years of
observation. The approach is similar to the critical incident technique that provides a set of
procedures for systematically identifying the behaviours that contribute to success and failure
12

in organisations by isolating each incident to investigate its effects and outcomes (Wikipedia,
2008).1 Table 3 provides a summary of the seven events and the information source(s) used
to investigate the effects and outcomes of each event. Although NSB committed to two
catering contracts over the course of this study – one for the vending machines on the trains
travelling medium distances, and one for serving food and beverage in the café wagons on
long distance trains – we have chosen to concentrate on the long distance travel contract only.
The reason for this is that long distance travel provides a more extreme example of problems
in supply chain procurement.
<Insert Table 3 here>
Event 1: New catering contract for high speed trains
In 1999, NSB invested heavily in new high speed trains for long distance routes. The intent
was to use faster trains that were capable of going at much higher speeds to enter a new
market by competing with airline companies for business customers travelling between the
major cities of Norway. Every effort was made to ensure that business customers on a NSB
train would experience a similar level of service to that of an airline; on each trip they would
be served a three-course meal, tea and coffee and offered free newspapers. Expected revenues
from this new business segment were high and a new catering contract with a suitable supplier
was required to provide a new upgraded menu that was considered necessary for business
class travel.
Management at NSB expected strong revenue growth from this new market and a
generous five-year (1999–2004) cost plus contract was developed with this belief in mind.
RGT received a fixed margin for all product delivered to the trains. All product expenses were

1

We thank the anonymous reviewer for bring this to our attention.
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paid by NSB with penalties included in the contract to ensure that sufficient product was
always available.
Event 2: Execution and commitment through incentives and penalties
Contract penalties for supply shortages created strong motivation for RGT employees to
deliver as much product as possible. This situation encouraged the oversupply of stock by
RGT as NSB carried all the risk for product sales and shrinkage. The RGT employees
manning the café wagons on each train were responsible for ordering deliveries before they
went off duty and exercised their own judgement regarding required amounts of stock. This
subjective approach to ordering resulted in large fluctuations in the quantity of food and
beverage ordered on each train. Large variations in the type of stock ordered were also
noticeable, although this was partly explained by differences in demand for particular
products between the different routes. For example, products consumed on one route, e.g.
Trondheim–Oslo, would vary for a train scheduled to go Oslo–Stavanger on the next day. The
reliance on orders made by staff on previous journeys created considerable frustration for
RGT staff that led to conflict between staff on different routes.
Other problems inherent in the catering process include: the difficulty of predicting
ticket sales and therefore the amount of stock needed – particularly in light of the fact that
many passengers would not make return journeys the same day; and the limited storage
facilities for keeping food fresh on the trains. The result was a high level of shrinkage on
some trips and a shortage of food trays on others.
Event 3: Disappointment and frustration with contract imbalance
Old track infrastructure meant that the new trains were not capable of going as fast as
predicted and the business customers did not choose train travel over plane travel as expected.
Consequently, the expected growth in revenue did not materialise and the catering contract
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began to cause problems immediately. For example, in 2001 NSB suffered a loss of between
US$8 – 12 million that was directly attributable to the onboard catering service. In contrast,
the cost plus contract ensured that RGT earned healthy profits. This created deep resentment
within NSB as the company felt that the supplier was earning money at their expense.
Event 4: Commitment to a roll-on-roll-off concept
In 2002, new management at RGT provided an opportunity for improved cooperation. NSB
decided to change the catering service offer to the business traveller and stop serving the three
dishes of food and instead provide passengers with free newspapers and tea and coffee. This
change was made in an effort to reduce the number of employees needed on each trip, and
also to reduce the logistic costs required to service the trains. A decision was also made to
implement a roll-on-roll-off concept where the goods were put on the trains in Oslo and the
unsold goods were taken off on the return to Oslo. This reduced shrinkage levels and made
the provision of food and beverage more accurate.
The new concept was more expensive in terms of the logistical costs paid to RGT, but
it drastically reduced shrinkage and secured more accurate stock provisions. Signs of
improved levels of cooperation and communication between the partners began to appear.
Regular meetings between the companies were subsequently scheduled to identify areas of
activity where costs incurred by NSB might be reduced. One of the main initiatives to come
out of these meetings was the decision to close down the warehouses in the cities of
Kristiansand and Bergen. This enabled most trains to be serviced from Oslo creating an
environment that further reduced the costs for NSB.
Event 5: Competitive bidding process initiated
Although the restructuring of train catering had led to improvements in financial performance
for NSB, by 2003 the situation had become untenable. The company continued to incur large
losses in catering and management began to look forward to 2004 when the original contract
15

was scheduled to expire. In preparation for a new round of contract negotiations, NSB ran a
BPM exercise to provide management with a visual aid for picturing work processes based on
inputs, outputs and linked tasks. Business process modelling (or mapping) is a general
methodology that supports improved design, management and improvement of business
processes in order to raise the productivity of a company (Smith and Fingar, 2003). The BPM
activity was designed to provide management with a better understanding of process
workflow before changes and improvements to the new contract were made.
The process of mapping train catering was a time consuming activity. The first step
was to create an “as-is” analysis of all aspects of train catering. This included, but was not
limited to, the onboard sales forecasts and planned deliveries, logistics and all the aspects of
physical deliveries to the trains and sale promotion activities. The BPM provided both
companies with greater awareness of process complexity and more respect for the challenges
faced by each other (see Figure 2 for a graphical overview).
<Insert Figure 2 here>
After the “as-is” BPM analysis was completed, the process of making a “should be”
analysis was started. The aim here was to identify the activities that could be performed in a
better manner. One of the unexpected benefits from the BPM exercise was that it acted as a
catalyst to develop a healthy relationship between the two companies. The team that worked
together to map the business processes included people from every department involved with
catering – both from NSB and RGT – resulting in the building of stronger relationships and
understanding. Not only did the shared activity ensure to some degree that NSB and RGT did
not make a process map that was too narrow, but the newly forged relationships based on
cooperation and trust would later form the cornerstone for successful contract renegotiation.
Event 6: New tender process

16

In parallel to the mapping process, NSB worked on preparing for the next catering tender
round. At the time, RGT was the only vendor capable of delivering train catering and NSB
spent a lot of time and effort trying to make the deal interesting to other companies. Through
many meetings with companies, NSB tried to create interest with alternative suppliers to
participate in the tender process. Cafes, restaurants, kiosks and other potential companies
attended the meetings, and some showed interest in the contract. NSB issued the request for
tender in late 2003 to all companies that had shown interest, including RGT. By the closing
date, NSB had only received one confirmation of intent to tender, from RGT.
NSB was left with two alternatives: (1) wait until the deadline of the tender and
negotiate with RGT as if others were bidding for work; or (2) approach RGT in an open and
honest manner and request that they enter into direct negotiation immediately. Waiting until
the deadline was risky because it was likely that RGT would discover that they were the only
supplier. It was anticipated that such a situation might invite ill will between the parties and
ruin the possibility of an equally profitable contract. NSB decided on the “open and honest”
option and invited RGT into direct negotiations making it clear that the goal was a long term
mutually beneficial contract. This approach was later shown to be efficacious as the
negotiations were characterised by openness and willingness to find the most optimal solution
for both parties.
Event 7: The new contract between NSB and RGT
The negotiation process began with a new “should be” BPM to which RGT proactively
contributed to this process with several suggestions for improvement. It was clear that both
parties had realised that mutual dependencies existed; RGT was the only supplier for NSB and
NSB was by far the largest customer for RGT. The partners made a preliminary agreement
stating in their objectives that they would share the “total pie” more efficiently and equitably.
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The new contract was based on a revenue sharing model. This required both parties to
share equally the burden of future over capacity. NSB paid a fixed amount for logistics and
administration that was based on RGT’s real costs at the time the contract was signed. It was
agreed that investments would be kept separate from fixed costs to ensure transparency over
depreciation periods. If major investments were necessary, RGT and NSB would discuss these
and decide upon new depreciation time periods.
All products sold onboard would accrue revenues to both NSB and RGT as both
companies have a net profit sharing arrangement for those products. The net profit is
calculated as the sales price minus the product price that RGT pays their suppliers and the net
profit percentage allocated to each company varies according to the amount of product sold.
The starting point was based on a net profit distribution that was shared 75:25 between NSB
and RGT. As sales increase, the percentage awarded to NSB increases. A supplier
arrangement also ensures that the fixed costs will decrease if the revenue exceeds certain
predefined levels.
These factors provided the incentive to push sales to far greater levels. When the
revenue was approaching the level where the fixed costs decrease, NSB had an incentive to
increase sales. Once that level was achieved, RGT had an incentive to increase sales to regain
the amount of fixed costs that had been reduced. These features of the contract provide strong
motivation for both parties and the results of the new contract have been very promising.
The new contract was signed in January 2004 and went into full effect from first of
July 2004. Following the changes in concepts and processes made since 2002 and
implementation of the new contract catering, profit onboard has improved by more than 40%
since 2002. This improvement can be attributed to the benefits of BPM in supporting contract
renegotiations. It is interesting to note that NSB is now one of the few train operators in
Europe that has been able to make a profit from onboard sales.
18

Interpretation of the Evidence from the Case
Let us now turn to the data and examine it from a revised model perspective (see Figure 3),
which begins with the original contract and the associated learning. The first issue is the
impact of over-optimism. Although one can find cases where over-optimism has positive
motivational value, it did not prove to be so in this situation (path “A”). In hindsight, one
could raise many questions regarding the quality of NSB’s decision making in an uncertain
environment. Even if the new market for high-speed train travel did meet expectations it is not
clear that the contract would have been distributively fair in terms of equity. As a senior NSB
manager noted: “evaluating train catering in Norway is difficult, the only operator with any
experience in the field is NSB and the only supplier with any experience is RGT. A lot of
guesswork goes on because there is insufficient experience to base our decisions on. In
hindsight, the uncertainties about demand should have been tackled in a better manner.”
Returning to our revised model, it is clear that the execution and learning identified an
imbalance as NSB incurred large losses (π < 0) while RGT achieved healthy profit (π > 0).
This situation created a need for a re-evaluation against remedial efficiency criterion (path
“B”).
<Insert Figure 3 here>
An assessment of the feasibility of this change indicated two problems. First, there was
no opportunity for joint profit. Second, since RGT earned healthy profit their motivation for
large changes in the contract was small. The switching costs involved in moving to an
alternative contract arrangement – one that RGT anticipated would be less profitable –
implied that such a change was undesirable for RGT. The most likely reason for this was a
combination of short sightedness on behalf of RGT and the belief that NSB was locked in
because alternative suppliers with the necessary skills were not available. At least
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theoretically, NSB could have created an alternative by establishing their own in-house
catering service, or signalling their willingness to do so. After all, they had handled train
catering in the past. However, NSB never made such a move, probably because it realized that
since it would hardly make sense from a business perspective, signalling their intention to
revert to in-house services would not be credible. In other words, NSB had no leverage and
could do little with respect to the activities on the train that would materially hurt RGT more
than it hurt NSB. Left with no alternative, NSB started to prepare for the contract termination
date and a new round of contract negotiations with alternative suppliers.
In the beginning the BPM project was based on a very traditional approach. That is,
the aim was simply to define the transactional activity (Soliman, 1998) so that a “data road
map” for future contract discussions could be created (path “C”). As the firms entered into the
BPM activities, learning took place and relationship-specific knowledge began to develop
(RQ > 0) from frequent and intense partner interactions, creating a better understanding of
each other’s procedures, management systems and cultures. The mutual understanding created
during this time was used to mitigate ex post coordination, conflict resolution, or informationgathering problems in more formal contractual arrangements (path “D”).
Important key success factors in the contract renegotiation were: (1) openness and trust
between the partners; (2) mutual dependency between the partners; (3) a true desire by all
members of the team to make improvements and find areas of potential savings; and (4) the
creation of a common goal between the partners; and (5) development of a thorough
understanding of all the little parts of the process that can be problematic. The application of
BPM made transparent the switching costs to all partners that provided the catalyst for a new
level of understanding that ultimately led to new and successful contract renegotiation (path
“E”).
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Taken together our case findings are in agreement with previous studies showing that
trust between parties is vital in order to achieve mutually beneficial solutions (Carson et al.,
2003; Holm et al., 1999; Ring and Van De Ven, 1994; Zaheer and Bell, 2005). Nevertheless,
the NSB-RGT case also shows that trust is no panacea: RGT, the supplier, did not readily
offer to forego the profits it was earning early on. The case findings also demonstrate the
importance of individuals in developing trust; the change of RGT management was seemingly
crucial for subsequent developments in the relationship between NSB and RGT. Relationships
are not static; the case of NSB and RGT provides a good illustration of how they change over
time, both in terms of content and performance. As pointed out by Lunnan and Haugland
(2008) it is the partners’ abilities to manage the evolution process that matter most in
achieving long-term benefits.

Concluding Discussion
The case of NSB and RGT illustrates that contracting incurs both ex ante and ex post costs
(Williamson, 1985). Ex ante costs include those of formalizing the contract − reaching
agreement on rights and responsibilities; meeting legal requirements; gathering information
and crafting optimal responses to a potentially large set of contingencies – and are costs that
arise out of parties attempts at dealing with uncertainty. Nevertheless, availability bias based
on the difficulty in imagining the plethora of ways that events can unfold (Russo and
Schoemaker, 1992) is a key concern that can lead to over-optimistic assumptions that
ultimately increase ex post costs. Ex post costs are associated with contract renegotiation
(Ring, 2002); reorganisation expenses and opportunity costs associated with management
time (Reuer and Arino, 2002). This includes the costs associated with BPM activities.
Theoretical implications
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As we have illustrated in this paper managers make ex ante mistakes that subsequently
requires parties to engage in economically costly efforts to redistribute profits as new
contingencies arise. Hence, ex ante and ex post contracting costs are interdependent and must
be considered interactively according to an upper bound or “fully efficient” state (Ring, 2002;
Williamson, 1985). The degree of satisfaction with an existing contracting arrangement hinges
on the extent to which it is perceived to be efficient and equitable. Most of the theoretical
arguments on the advantages of inter-organisational supply chain relationships implicitly
assume that parties can agree on the mutual benefits that are central to supply chain
management (Chen and Paulraj, 2004; Holweg et al., 2005). Yet, little research has been
undertaken to show how collaboration is achieved in a supply chain setting and gaps exist in
the literature on outsourcing in the supply chain.
As mentioned earlier, trust is often seen as a key issue in much of the inter-firm
relationship literature and our case study adds analytical generalisability to the evidence about
its benefits. By analytical generalisability we mean the way empirical observations generalise
to theory, rather than the population as is typical of statistical generalisability (e.g., Yin 1994;
Gibbert et al. 2008). However, trust based mechanisms alone do not always ensure troublefree future cooperation in supply chain relationships. The notion of trust-based relations,
while appealing in its positive vision of inter-firm relationships, can be one-sided and overly
optimistic. Studies of inter-firm relationships (see, e.g., Jap and Anderson, 2003; Petersen et
al., 2006) point out that the parties involved also should be aware of “residual” opportunism
on both sides of the contractual relationship. For example, although some suppliers may
deliberately underperform, service buyers at times terminate contracts in untimely ways;
promises and good intentions alone are not always enough. Safeguarding suppliers against
termination should of course lead to smoother, longer-term and more reciprocal relationships,
but will not eliminate the possibility that some suppliers also pursue their own, more self22

interested, agendas. Monitoring and other kinds of anti-shirking measures – as well as the
development of trust and goal congruence between parties – may help building sustainable
relationships (Jap and Anderson, 2003).
Practical implications
The study provides important insights for practitioners who are contemplating, or who have
responsibility for, outsourcing procurement and other supply chain activities. Supporting
human collaboration is challenging partly because of variability in how people work and think
and we re-emphasise that cognitive shortcomings are unlikely to disappear and to some extent
are unavoidable. Hence, contract managers should take certain precautions to minimise the
risk. We suggest two distinct approaches that can help companies mitigate the risks in the
supply chain contract design context. First, we provide a remedial framework to counter
biases and guide decision making. Second, we show that companies can create the trust and
cooperation required to support contract renegotiation by embedding BPM into the contract
development process.
Another important contribution this paper makes to managerial practice is
demonstrating how BPM can force inter- and intra-organisational teams to think through the
entire value chain. Unfortunately, most of the research conducted in BPM has been focussed
on software management or efforts to define double work and non-value-adding activities
(Soliman, 1998). This is a shame as BPM offers much more and is essentially a new way of
managing the firm that is based on a more holistic approach. Business process modelling can
be used to capture complementary benefits such as resources, managerial motivations, social
exchanges and various inter- and intra-organisational dependencies. Through our longitudinal
case study, we confirm the enterprise level value of BPM as an important enabler of trust,
collaboration and routine. The use of BPM acts as a safeguard for the firm and its suppliers to
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ensure existing processes are well understood and also serve as a baseline for future decision
making.
Limitations and future research opportunities
This longitudinal research has two limitations. First, the study is limited to two organisations
within the transportation sector. Therefore, attempts to extend the conclusions regarding the
value of BPM to other research contexts may not necessarily hold. Nevertheless, industrial
sectors with comparable structural characteristics and environmental circumstances may draw
inferences from this work. Second, the findings in this paper are at best exploratory. This does
not reduce the legitimacy or value of the research design in contributing to this research. The
longitudinal research design provides in-depth insight into a significant “real-world” problem
from which there is little academic theory. Furthermore, the longitudinal data collection
approach enables us to mitigate retrospective sense-making and impression management
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007b).
Opportunities exist for future research to further investigate the role that BPM plays in
supporting collaboration, trust and routine. The existing research is largely based on a coarse
or global approach to contractual arrangements that could mask some of the more complex
effects in a contractual arrangement (Reuer and Ariño, 2007). Further research based on how
firms move from one contractual arrangement to another could prove helpful in better
understanding the heterogeneity that exists within and across discrete governance structures in
the supply chain.
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